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is equally protected even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation
of the State. The Touchstone of Due Process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government." Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S. Ct 2963, 2976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 952,
citing,Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123, 9 S. Ct. 231,233, 32
L. Ed. 2d 623, 626 (1889). Thus Virginia has a constitutional duty to
protect against the arbitrary and capricious application of the
aggravating factors in § 19.2-264.2 by the sentencing body.
The irreversible nature of the death penalty makes it even more
imperative that the accused be protected from arbitrary action of the
government See, Booth v. Maryland,482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529,
96 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1987) (holding the "unique nature of the death
penalty required additional protection during pretrial, guilt and
sentencing phases); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978);

Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280 (1976). Hence, the "...
Constitution places special constraints on the procedures used to
convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him to death."
Murray v. Giarrantano,109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d. 713 (1989);
See also, Beck v.Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed.
2d 392 (1980) (trial judge must give jury the option to convict of a
lesser offense; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (jury must be allowed to
consider all of a capital defendant's mitigating evidence). Therefore
the severe and irreversible nature of the death penalty requires
Virginia judges and attorneys to guide and limit the sentencers'
discretion in applying the "vileness factors."
Whether Virginia's "vileness factors" are a federal requirement
or a matter of state legislative choice, these factors are unconstitutional as applied in Virginia.
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There has been some question in recent years whether/under
what circumstances the prosecution in a capital murder trial might
use psychiatric' testimony to support its case at the penalty phase that
the defendant should receive the death penalty. To the casual
observer, it might appear that the matter was resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in its 1983 opinion in Barefoot v. Estelle. 2 It
was not, however.
Barefoot concerned psychiatric testimony given in response to
hypothetical questions posed by the prosecution at the penalty phase
of defendant Thomas Barefoot's capital murder trial in Texas.
Neither of the psychiatrists who appeared for the state had personally
examined Barefoot, yet both testified that, assuming the truth of the
statements contained in the prosecution's hypotheticals, Barefoot was
a "sociopath" who was not amenable to treatment and who would
commit acts of violence in the future if given a chance. Under Texas
law at that time, the trier of fact was required to impose the death
penalty on a finding of two aggravating factors: (1) that the defendant
killed deliberately, and (2) that the defendant would probably commit
further acts of violence in the future.
Barefoot was sentenced to death. On appeal, he argued that,
given (1) the law's heightened concern for reliability in capital case
decision-making and (2) the patent unreliability of psychiatric
dangerousness prediction-an unreliability well-documented in the
psychiatric literature3 and forcefully attested to by the American
Psychiatric Association in its amicus brief in his case-the state's
introduction of psychiatric testimony on the question of his dangerousness violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, was not impressed.
Writing for the majority, Justice White observed, "[i]f it is not
impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion
[that a defendant is dangerous], it makes little sense, if any, to
suggest that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who
might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the
subject that they should not be permitted to testify." Justice White
suggested that concerns about the unreliability of prediction testimony properly go to the weight to be accorded such testimony, not to
its admissibility: "We are unconvinced.., that the adversary process

cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence
and opinion about future dangerousness ....
The opinion of the Court in Barefoot, of course, was concerned
solely with questions of constitutional law. The Court did not resolve
whether the psychiatrists' testimony satisfied the requirements of
Texas law governing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony.
Thus, while perhaps not constitutionally objectionable, psychiatric
testimony on the question of future dangerousness might be objectionable on state evidence law grounds. Certainly in any state that
recognizes the Frye 'test for the admissibility of scientific evidence-a test requiring not only that the witness have specialized
knowledge or skills "beyond the ken of the lay person" but also that
the subject matter of the testimony have gained general acceptance in
the scientific community-psychiatric predictions of future violence
would be highly suspect. Even in Virginia, where the Frye test
recently was rejected in favor of a test speaking more generally in
terms of "reliability," 6 a good argument can be made that dangerousness predictions should be excluded. There can be no guarantee of
that such an argument will prevail in a given case, however. Indeed,
as a matter of practice, psychiatric predictions
of future dangerous8
ness are heard in courtrooms every day.
Fortunately, it should rarely be necessary to resort to the
evidentiary objection when the prosecution offers psychiatric
evidence in aggravation. Indeed, in the usual case--one in which the
psychiatrist's opinion is based on a personal examination of the
defendant-a winning objection ordinarily can be made on Fifth,
Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment grounds, or, in Virginia, on
statutory grounds.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Estelle v. Smith
that Fifth Amendment protection must be accorded a defendant at the
penalty phase of a capital trial. The defendant in Estelle was
sentenced to death on the strength of a psychiatrist's prediction that
he would be violent in the future if permitted to live. The psychiatrist's opinion was based on an evaluation he performed prior to trial
to assess the defendant's competency to stand trial. The psychiatrist
did not warn the defendant that the evaluation might be used to
address the issue of future dangerousness. Declaring the psychia-
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trist's testimony in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights, Chief Justice Burger observed:
"When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting
to the court on the issue of competency and
testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase
on the crucial issue of respondent's future
dangerousness, his role changed and became
essentially like that of an agent of the state
recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting. During the psychiatric
evaluation, respondent assuredly was "faced with
a phase of the adversary system" and was "not
in the presence of [a] person acting solely in
his interests." [CitingMiranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436,469 (1966).110

The court went on to find a Sixth Amendment violation as well in the
state's failure to notify defense counsel that the psychiatric evaluation
would encompass the issue of dangerousness. In the absence of such
notification, the court held, the defendant was denied the advice of
counsel at a "critical stage" of the adversary process.
A more difficult case is presented where the defendant and his
or her counsel have been notified as to the potential uses of a
psychiatric evaluation. Even here, however, effective objections
might be made to the state's presentation of evaluation findings in its
case-n-chief at the penalty phase. Indeed, to permit the state to
present as evidence in aggravation disclosures made by the defendant
during an evaluation requested by the defense to explore factors in
mitigation, or during an evaluation demanded by the prosecution as a
condition to the admissibility of psychiatric evidence for the
defense," ' is to put the defendant to an untenable choice between his
or her constitutional rights: the Sixth Amendment right to explore and
present clinically derived evidence in mitigation 2 and the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination. The United States
Supreme Court, in an analogous case, has ruled that the defendant
may not be required to make such choice. 13 Simmons v. United
States, 4 concerned a defendant who had provided incriminating
testimony during a pretrial hearing to suppress evidence in his case.
At trial, the prosecution presented the defendant's suppression
hearing testimony as evidence of his guilt. The defendant was
convicted. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court observed
that the defendant "was obliged either to give up what he believed,
with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in
legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination.... In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
5
another."'
A number of courts, including the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 16 have extended the Simmons
rationale to cases in which incriminating statements made during a
pretrial psychiatric evaluation (e.g., to assess criminal responsibility,
or "sanity" at the time of the offense) were used at trial as evidence of
guilt. The rule that has emerged is that if the defendant participates in
sich an evaluation and subsequently raises an insanity defense, the
prosecution may use statements the defendant made during the
evaluation only to address the defendant's claim of insanity, not to
prove the elements of the offense charged. 7 May this rationale be
extended further to cover the case of the defendant who, during an
evaluation to assess factors in mitigation, discloses information that is
relevant to factors in aggravation? In a state like Virginia, where, at
the penalty phase, the prosecution is obliged to prove particular
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, these aggravating

factors might be seen as functionally equivalent to the elements of the
crime at the guilt phase. Accordingly, given the Fifth Amendment's
applicability to the penalty phase of a capital case s , it follows that no
statements made by the defendant during an evaluation to assess
factors in mitigation, and no evidence derived from such statements,
should be admissible at the penalty phase to support the prosecution's
case in aggravation. Rather, the prosecution's use of such evidence
should be limited to addressing claims made by the defense in
mitigation. This argument was presented to the United States
Supreme Court in a Virginia case, Smith v. Murray", but the court
avoided responding on procedural grounds, finding the defendant's
failure to raise the issue in its appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court
to be a procedural bar to its subsequent presentation.20
Although the Supreme Court still has not resolved the matter,
statutes have been enacted in a number of states protecting disclosures made by a defendant during a psychiatric evaluation from use
by the prosecution to advance its case in aggravation. In 1986, the
Virginia General Assembly enacted such a statute, reflecting very
clearly the petitioner's argument in Smith:
No statement or disclosure by the defendant made during a competency evaluation performed pursuant to § 19.2-169.1, an evaluation
performed pursuant to §19.2-169.5 to determine sanity at the time of
the offense, treatment provided pursuant to §19.2-169.2 or § 19.2169.6 or a capital sentencing evaluation performed pursuant to this
section, and no evidence derived from any such statements or
disclosures may be introduced against the defendant at the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial for the purpose of proving the
aggravating circumstances specified in §19.2-264.4. Such statements
or disclosures shall be admissible in rebuttal only when relevant to
issues in mitigation raised by the defense.2 '
Thus, defendants facing capital sentencing proceedings in Virginia
courts are afforded a significant degree of statutory protection.
Several questions remain, however. First, is there any bar to the
prosecution's use of a psychiatrist to respond to hypothetical
questions concerning the defendant's future dangerousness, as was
done in Barefoot? Probably not. Unless the psychiatrist's opinion is
based at least in part on statements made by the defendant during an
evaluation, neither the Virginia statute nor the Fifth Amendment is
applicable. Moreover, there is no Sixth Amendment issue. Thus, the
only argument available to the defense under these circumstances, it
seems, would be the evidentiary argument discussed above: that
psychiatrists cannot reliably predict future dangerousness and,
therefore, should not be qualified as experts to state an opinion on the
matter. This argument may be bolstered by reference to the professional literature admonishing psychiatrists 2not
to diagnose anyone
2
whom they have not personally examined.
A second, particularly troubling question left unresolved by the
Virginia statute concerns psychiatric testimony for the prosecution
which ostensibly is presented as evidence in rebuttal to the defendant's case in mitigation, but which, at least implicitly, supports the
prosecution's case in aggravation. For example, if a defendant claims
"extreme mental or emotional disturbance" at the time of the offense,
might the prosecution present as evidence in rebuttal the testimony of
a psychiatrist that, during an evaluation, the defendant admitted to
having coolly killed on other occasions? In Buchananv. Kentucky23 ,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution, on crossexamination of a mental health expert for the defense at the penalty
phase of a capital trial, was free to ask about excerpts from the
expert's written report which were less favorable to the defense than
those presented on direct examination. "[I]f a defendant requests such
an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least,
the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the
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reports of the examination that the defendant requested. The
defendant would have no Fifth Amendment privilege against the
introduction of this psychiatric testimony by the prosecution." The
report excerpts in question in Buchanan,however, pertained solely to
the expert's "general observations about the mental status of
petitioner" and included no "statements by petitioner dealing with the
crimes for which he was charged." Whether statements about other
violent acts would be considered admissible as evidence of mental
status (in rebuttal to defense mental status evidence) or would be
excluded on Fifth Amendment grounds (as evidence in aggravation)
is unclear. Defense counsel in Virginia, however, should be prepared
to argue that the plain meaning of the language in the Virginia statute
is that, while the prosecution ordinarily may introduce evaluation
findings to rebut defense claims in mitigation, if these findings at the
same time speak to factors in aggravation, their introduction is
barred, at least where the claim in mitigation is not that factor in
aggravation do not exist.
What about the case in which the defense claims an absence of
aggravating factors? If, for example, the defense decides to argue in
mitigation that the defendant is not likely to be violent in the future,
is the door thereby opened to the prosecution to present psychiatric
testimony of future dangerousness as evidence in rebuttal? If so, must
the defense first present psychiatric evidence of non-dangerousness,
or is the door opened by any defense evidence, for example the
testimony of a neighbor that "he'd never hurt a flea?" These
questions are unresolved.
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